Welcome to Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology
Volume 18Issue 1
.
Turn off MathJax
Article Contents
LIU Li-jun. Evolutionarily Cooperative Stable of Science & Technology Alliance Under Self-organized Organization[J]. JOURNAL OF BEIJING INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, 2009, 18(1): 101-105.
Citation: LIU Li-jun. Evolutionarily Cooperative Stable of Science & Technology Alliance Under Self-organized Organization[J].JOURNAL OF BEIJING INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, 2009, 18(1): 101-105.

Evolutionarily Cooperative Stable of Science & Technology Alliance Under Self-organized Organization

  • Received Date:2008-03-25
  • The cooperative evolutionary stability under self-organized organization is discussed in this paper. The differences between the objects studied by cooperative game theory and the ones studied by cooperative game in science & technology alliance are analyzed. The mutant probability of agent’s utility under endogenous technical factor condition is analyzed. By clarifying the connotation of Pareto-dominate institution in cooperative game, the efficient and feasible managerial definition of Pareto-dominate Institution in science & technology alliance is presented. The evolutionarily cooperative game for the agent in Pareto-dominate institution is explained. And then the necessary condition of cooperative evolutionary stabilization based on multi-agent utility's dynamic equilibrium is put forward. Finally, the model of alliance's utility's dynamic equilibrium under self-organization is established.
  • loading
  • [1]
    Rond M. Reviewer 198, the hedgehog, and the fox: Next generation theories in strategy[J]. Journal of Management Inquiry, 2002,11(1): 35-45.
    [2]
    Becker S G. The economic approach to human behavior[M]. Shanghai: Shanghai People Press,1976. (in Chinese)
    [3]
    Cooper W R. Coordination games: Complementarities and macroeconomics[M]. Beijing: China People University Press,2001. (in Chinese)
    [4]
    Esteban J. Endogenous bargaining power . . http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract.
    [5]
    Masahiko A. Towards a comparative institutional analysis[M]. Cambrige: The MIT Press,2001.
    [6]
    Leonard-Barton D. Core capabilitities and core rigidities: A paradox in managing new product development[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 1992,13:111-125.
    [7]
    Maes S, Tuyls K, Manderick B. Modeling a multi-agent environment combining influence diagrams //IA-WTIC Proceedings. Las Vegas, USA: , 2001:379-384.
    [8]
    Lane D A, Maxfield R R. Ontological uncertainty and innovation[J]. Complexity Digest, 2004,26:1-48.
    [9]
    Holland J H. Hidden order: How adaptation builds complexity[M]. Shanghai: Shanghai Scientific & Technological Education Publishing House,1995. (in Chinese)
    [10]
    Ren Shougen. Economy analysis on simulating behaviors[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2002,1:81-90. (in Chinese)
    [11]
    Schelling T C. The strategy of conflict[M]. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1960.
    [12]
    Weibull J W. Evolutionary game theory[M]. Cambridge: The MIT Press,1995.
    [13]
    Li Baoming. Utility theory and nash equilibrium choice: Discuss the harmony and cooperation[M]. Beijing: Economy Science Press,2003. (in Chinese) (Edited by
  • 加载中

Catalog

    通讯作者:陈斌, bchen63@163.com
    • 1.

      沈阳化工大学材料科学与工程学院 沈阳 110142

    1. 本站搜索
    2. 百度学术搜索
    3. 万方数据库搜索
    4. CNKI搜索

    Article Metrics

    Article views (173) PDF downloads(37) Cited by()
    Proportional views
    Related

    /

      Return
      Return
        Baidu
        map