An Analysis on the Optimality of Wavering or not Wavering Auditing Collusion
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摘要:审计合谋存在的主要原因就是审计中要涉及到三个博弈方:委托人-审计人员-经理,由于信息不对称和道德风险的存在,在审计活动中代理人有贿赂审计人员使之产生合谋行为的可能,委托人必须决定是允许还是制止合谋。无论允许还是制止合谋都是有成本的,通过模型分析和论证我们得出了一个允许和制止合谋的最优范围,帮助委托方进行决策提供理论依据。Abstract:The main reason for the auditing collusion is that it involves three parties consisting of principal, auditor and manager in auditing practice. Because of information asymmetrical and moral hazards, it is possible that the agents bribe the auditors for collusion, the principal must decide whether or not to allow collusion. Either allowing or deterring collusion is costly, but an analysis and reasoning an optimal scope of allowing or deterring collusion is offered to provide reference for the principal policy maker.
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Key words:
- Auditing/
- collusion/
- bribe/
- honesty/
- dishonesty
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