政府采购合同设计与承制单位价格信息
Contract Design and Cost Revelation in Government Acquisition
-
摘要:从政府采购项目合同设计的角度分析政府采购项目价格费用信息失真导致费用上涨的问题。价格信息失真由企业降低价格的努力不足和价格造假两方面造成。运用机制设计“使人说真话”的经济思想建立政府采购价格显示的经济学模型。模型把政府采购的经济关系抽象为不同的外生变量和内生变量, 从理论上分析采购方提供何种类型的合约能够使得“承制单位显示价格信息”。模型认为政府采购方提供具有不同分摊比例的合约菜单能够使得企业显示其价格信息。在合约菜单的约束下, 具有较低价格特征的承制单位将选择具有较低分摊比例的合约, 具有较高价格特征的承制单位将选择具有较高分摊比例的合约。根据“合约菜单”模型结果得出价格显示的现实选择:加强基于目标价格的过程监控;加强企业价格行为监控;培育富有竞争活力的政府采购市场。Abstract:Government programs are criticized for cost overruns. Information revelation as a new perspective for this issue is proposed. The distortion of the cost information includes two parts: distortion resulted by low powered incentives and distortion resulted by cost padding. Further, a mathematical structure that models institutions through which equipment acquisition activity is guided and coordinated is presented based on the theory of designing economic mechanisms. We use this cost revelation model to discuss what institutions should be created in order to achieve desired goals the revelation of the real cost. The method involves the construction of the relation between the cost type of arm firms and the type of the contracts. The model suggests the general idea that the acquisition side should structure bargaining by providing a series of linear contracts menu so that firms claiming to be lower cost select themselves into contracts where they bear a higher share of risk. According to the contract menu result of the revelation model, all-period control based on target-cost, monitoring of arm firms, advance for competition of arms market are put forward as the equipment cost revelation mechanism.
-
[1] 阮铃雯. 政府采购制度问题研究——国际经验比较和中国政策选择[D]. 天津:南开大学博士学位论文, 2006:20-25. [2] Stuart F H. Purchasing, principles and applications [M]. Prentice Hall, 1986:451-452. [3] Jerome B. Effective financial management in public and nonprofit agencies[M]. London: Quorum Books, 1995:512-515. [4] Gibbard A. Manipulation of voting schemes:a general result[J]. Econometrica, 1973:587-591. [5] Hurwicz L. On informational decentralized systems[J]. Decision and Organization, 1972:297-301. [6] Maskin. Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999:23-24. [7] Roger Myerson. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1983:265-271. [8] Groves. Incentives in teams[J]. Econometrica, 1973:620-624. [9] Laffont. On the revelation of preferences for public goods[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 1977:428-430. [10] Laffont, Tirole. A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation[M]. America:The MIT Press, 1993:110-113. [11] Keith Hartley, Todd Sandler. The handbook of defense economics[M]. Holland:The North Holland Press, 1995:361-362. [12] Reichelstein. Constructing incentive schemes for government contracts:an application of agency theory[J]. The Accounting Review, 1992:712-731. [13] McAfee, McMillan. Auctions and bidding[J]. Journal of Economic Literature, 1987:699-738. [14] Laffont Jean-Jacques, Tirole Jean. Auctioning incentive contracts[J]. Econometrica, 1987:1153-1175. [15] Riordan, Sappington. Awarding monopoly franchises[J]. American Economic Review, 1987:375-387. [16] Olson M. The logic of collective action[D]. Cambridge Ma:Harvard University Press, 1965:34-36. [17] Stigler G. The economic theory of regulation[J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1971:3-21. -
点击查看大图
计量
- 文章访问数:685
- HTML全文浏览量:0
- PDF下载量:10
- 被引次数:0
下载:
