考虑总部关注的相对业绩报酬契约设计
Design of Compensation Contract Based on Relative Performance Evaluation Considering Headquarters’Attention
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摘要:企业集团情境下,子公司经营者凭借自身的信息优势,可以采取与总部意图相悖行为以追求自身利益最大化。为了缓和子公司经营者与集团总部之间的委托代理冲突,构建基于三维度相对业绩比较的报酬契约模型,能够剔除外部环境、集团总部关注、子公司资源存量对经营者真实业绩的干扰影响。通过数学分析和应用实例表明,引入同一行业内部其它企业业绩、集团内部其他子公司业绩和子公司自身历史业绩,有利于提高经营者报酬契约的激励有效性。Abstract:In the conglomerate, subsidiary's executive always has unique information and different interests which deviate from headquarters' intention. In order to alleviate this contradiction between the principal-agent relations, we construct a compensation contract model based on three-dimension relative performance evaluation. The model could accurately evaluate executive's actual performance by eliminating interference from external environment, corporate headquarters' attention and subsidiary's existent resource. Finally, the mathematical results and application example show that the extended compensation contract could improve incentive efficiency by introducing other enterprises' performance in the industry, other subsidiaries' performance in the conglomerate, and its own history performance.
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