减排政策实施效果的非完全信息动态博弈

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doi:10.15918/j.jbitss1009-3370.2015.0404

仲伟周¹,
张金灿¹

1.
西安交通大学经济与金融学院, 西安 710061

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172184);2014年陕西省软科学项目(2014KRM15);2014年度西安交通大学基本科研业务费国际科技合作项目

Analysis based on Incomplete Information Dynamic Game about Implementation Effect of Carbon Reduction Policy

ZHONG Weizhou¹,
ZHANG Jincan¹

1.
School of Economics and Finance, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710061, China

摘要:碳排放具有外部性、公共产品等特性,仅依靠市场调节会产生“市场失灵”现象,因此政府部门需发挥积极作用,制定科学合理的减排政策。针对碳减排政策实施效果问题,构建一个基于中央政府与地方政府关系的三阶段非完全信息动态博弈模型,分析碳减排政策实施效果的影响因素,并选取中国30个省2000-2012年的面板数据对博弈结果进行验证。研究结果认为:对地方政府减排行为奖励越多,则碳减排政策实施效果越好;地方政府抵制中央减排政策所获得的额外收益越大,则碳减排政策实施效果越差;中央政府提高对地方政府违规行为惩罚的概率和力度可以激励地方政府积极减排,同时也增加了中央政府的收益;碳排放强度越高的地区,地方政府减排动力越小,中央政府减排政策实施效果越差。
- 减排政策实施效果/
- 非完全信息动态博弈模型/
- 中央政府与地方政府
Abstract:Carbon emissions have the characteristics of externality and public product. If we only rely on market regulation, it will produce the phenomenon of “market failure”. So government departments need to play a positive role, and formulate scientific and reasonable emission reduction policies. In order to analyze the implementation effect of carbon emission reduction policy, this paper builds a three stage incomplete information dynamic game model based on the relationship between the central government and local government. Then this paper analyzes and points out the influence factors of carbon emission reduction policy implementation effect. Finally this article selects the panel data of 30 provinces from 2000 to 2012 to verify the result of this game. The results show that the more we reward the local government for its carbon reduction behavior, the better the effect of carbon policy. The greater local government's gain of extra income by resisting the central policies is, the worse the effect of carbon policy. The central government can encourage local governments to actively reduce emissions by improving the probability and strength of punishment for local government' illegal behavior, and at the same time this can increase the income of the central government. If the carbon intensity is high, the local governments have no impetus to reduce carbon emission and the effect of central government's policies will be very poor.

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减排政策实施效果的非完全信息动态博弈

doi:10.15918/j.jbitss1009-3370.2015.0404

Analysis based on Incomplete Information Dynamic Game about Implementation Effect of Carbon Reduction Policy

计量

减排政策实施效果的非完全信息动态博弈

doi:10.15918/j.jbitss1009-3370.2015.0404

1. 西安交通大学经济与金融学院, 西安 710061

English Abstract

Analysis based on Incomplete Information Dynamic Game about Implementation Effect of Carbon Reduction Policy

1. School of Economics and Finance, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710061, China

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留言板

减排政策实施效果的非完全信息动态博弈

doi:10.15918/j.jbitss1009-3370.2015.0404

Analysis based on Incomplete Information Dynamic Game about Implementation Effect of Carbon Reduction Policy

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出版历程

减排政策实施效果的非完全信息动态博弈

doi:10.15918/j.jbitss1009-3370.2015.0404

1. 西安交通大学 经济与金融学院, 西安 710061

English Abstract

Analysis based on Incomplete Information Dynamic Game about Implementation Effect of Carbon Reduction Policy

1. School of Economics and Finance, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710061, China

目录

作者相关

写作规范

友情链接

1. 西安交通大学经济与金融学院, 西安 710061