Study of Collusion-proof for War Material Contract Reserve
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摘要:战备物资委托企业合同储备过程中存在多重委托代理关系,结合博弈理论,分析军方-军代表-代储企业三方损益,考虑合谋惩罚因素和名誉损失惩罚因素。在分析合谋形成条件的基础上,建立战备物资合同储备预防合谋机制模型,得出混合战略均衡解,模型的均衡解反映了代储企业与军代表选择违规获取合谋收益的最佳概率,以及军方监管机构选择监督的均衡概率,得出监管力度和监管成本的合理组合,实现监管效益最大化。通过实例仿真讨论模型在不同参数下的合谋条件,识别合谋监管的关键变量,为完善战备物资合同储备监管机制提供参考。Abstract:Multiple principal-agent relations exist in the war material contract reserve. Based on the Game Theory, this study analyzed profit and loss of the military, military representative and contract reserve enterprise, and investigated the factors of punishment for collusion and loss of reputation. Based on the forming condition of collusion, it built the model of collusion-prevention for the war material contract reserve, worked out the mixed strategy equilibrium, and analyzed it. The mixed strategy equilibrium reflects the best probability for contract reserve enterprise and military representative to collude, and the equilibrium probability for the military to choose supervision. It calculated the reasonable combination of supervision strength and cost, maximum interests of supervision. Through simulation, model parameters are carried out to estimate the degree of parameter sensitivity, the key variables to identify collusions, providing references to improve the supervision procedure of the war material contract reserve.
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Key words:
- war material/
- contract reserve/
- collusion prevention/
- utility function
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