Individual Heterogeneity and the Private Effective Provision of Environmental Public Goods
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摘要:解决累积性环境恶化问题亟需所有个人与组织转变行为方式，为实现环境公共物品的有效供给而共同努力。基于个体异质性，选取最重要的异质性维度——偏好异质性和成本异质性，分析在单维和多维场景下，个体有效提供环境公共物品的均衡条件，以及政府环境政策工具的实施效率。研究结果表明：只存在个体偏好异质性时，潜在的大集团无法实现环境公共物品的有效供给，强制控制方法通过设立企业必须遵守的排污限制和技术标准等，能够提高环境公共物品的供给效率；而同时存在个体偏好异质性和成本异质性时，市场化方法能够发挥其资源有效配置的基础性作用，通过规避强制标准检测、执行的困难和政策后果的不确定性，提供比后者更高水平的环境公共物品。结合研究结论，认为应强化环境信息公开，加大环保法规标准执行力度，明晰环境治理责任主体，通过利益杠杆调动公众积极性。Abstract:To solve the problem of cumulative environmental degradation, all individuals and organizations need to change their behavior modes, and work together to achieve the effective provision of environmental public goods. Based on individual heterogeneity, the paper selected the most important dimensions of heterogeneity-preference and cost heterogeneity-to analyze the equilibrium conditions for individuals to provide environmental public goods effectively in one-dimensional and multi-dimensional scenarios, as well as the implementation efficiency of government environmental policy instruments. The results of the study show that when there is only individual preference heterogeneity, potentially large groups cannot achieve effective provision of environmental public goods. By establishing emission limits and technical standards that enterprises must comply with, the mandatory control method can improve the provision efficiency of public goods. However, when there are individual preferences and cost heterogeneity at the same time, the market-oriented method can play a fundamental role in the effective allocation of resources. By avoiding the difficulties of inspection and implementation of mandatory standard as well as the uncertainty of policy execution, the market-oriented method can provide a higher-level environmental public goods than the mandatory control method. Combined with the research conclusions, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions, such as making public environmental information, increasing the enforcement of environmental laws and regulation standards, making clear of the main responsible subjects for environmental governance, and mobilizing public enthusiasm through interest levers.
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