Two-sided Platform Pricing Research Considering Reference Price Effects And Information Level
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摘要:垄断双边市场中，在考虑用户信息水平的基础上，将参照价格引入用户需求函数，构建双边平台收益模型，分析平台定价策略。研究结果表明：垄断平台应披露价格信息，使用户形成响应性预期，同时设定较高的参照价格而实际定低价；用户缺乏信息时，平台对两边最优定价与两边的参照价格成正比；不同的是，用户完全信息时，随着平台两边交叉网络外部性的增大，买方（卖方）参照价格的增大使平台对买方（卖方）定价先增加后减小，卖方（买方）参照价格与平台对买方（卖方）定价的关系还依赖于平台两边交叉网络外部性的相对大小；用户完全信息时平台收益更多，且收益的增幅随着两边用户参照价格及其影响系数的增大而增大。Abstract:With the development of Internet and information technology,the platform attracts more users to join the platform by setting a higher reference price and a lower original. Thus,the reference price also has a significant impact on users' decision-making behavior and platform pricing. Based on the consideration of users' information level in monopoly two-sided markets,the reference price is introduced into users' demand function,a two-sided platform equilibrium model is constructed and the impact of the reference price effect on platform pricing is analyzed. The research shows that the monopoly platform should allow users to be informed. Besides,set a higher reference price and the actual low price. When the users are uninformed,the optimal pricing on both sides of the platform increase with the increase of users' reference price. However,when the users are informed,with the increase of the network externality on both sides of the platform,the increase of the buyer's(seller's) reference price makes the platform's price charged to the buyer(seller) increase first and then decrease,and the relationship between the seller's(buyer's) reference price and the platform's price charged to the buyer (seller) also depends on the relative size of the network externality on both sides of the platform. The platform gains more when users are informed and the growth of revenue increases with users' reference price and influence coefficient of users' reference price.
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Key words:
- two-sided markets/
- platform pricing/
- reference price/
- informed/
- uninformed
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