The Construction of Non-Compliance Procedures under the Paris Agreement on Carbon Emission Reduction Commitments
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摘要:在全球气候治理的新形势下，《巴黎协定》第15条提出将建立一个能够让各国遵守减排承诺的遵约机制。这种遵约机制建立的核心是对没有履行减排承诺的缔约国制定不遵约情事程序。减排承诺下的不遵约情事程序是一种促进性的、不以惩罚性为主的遵约保障程序，各缔约方就该程序的制定尚未能达成一致。在处理不遵约情事程序和条约强制性要素的关系、不遵约情事如何体现共同但有区别责任原则以及其与透明度规则、全球盘点机制的关系等方面困境重重。为构建一个遵约实效和减排计划相匹配的程序规则，应当以独立性遵约委员会为监管主体，结合国家减排能力，明确不遵约的各种情事边界和执行措施。制定包含资金、技术支持的援助性条款，同时对恶意逃避遵约等情况也制定谴责、中止相关权利等条款。不遵约情事程序仍然会以鼓励遵约为主，以期对各缔约方履行减排承诺和遵守遵约目标进行保障。Abstract:Under the new situation of global climate governance,the Paris agreement proposes in article 15 to establish a compliance mechanism that can promote compliance and enable countries to abide by their emission reduction commitments. The core of this compliance mechanism is to establish non-compliance procedures for parties that fail to fulfill their emission reduction commitments. However,the non-compliance procedure under the emission reduction commitment is a promotion and non-punitive compliance safeguard procedure,and the parties have not reached consensus on the formulation of the procedure. There are many difficulties in dealing with the relationship between non-compliance procedures and mandatory elements of treaties,how non-compliance embodies the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities,and its relationship with the rules of transparency and the global inventory mechanism. In order to build a procedure rule that matches the actual effect of compliance and emission reduction plan,the independent compliance committee should be the subject of supervision,and the national capacity of emission reduction should be combined to define the boundary of various circumstances and implementation measures for non-compliance. Assist clauses including financial and technical support are formulated. Meanwhile,reprimand and suspension of relevant rights are also formulated for cases of malicious evasion of compliance. However,non-compliance procedures will continue to mainly encourage compliance,with a view to ensuring the parties' compliance with emission reduction commitments and compliance with compliance targets.
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