The Performance Evaluation of Cost-driven Extended Producer Responsibility Implementation Modes—Rate Mode VS Tax Mode
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摘要:生产者延伸责任赋予生产者回收、循环、再利用的责任,生产者主导的率模式和政府平台主导的税模式是生产者回收责任实现策略的两种主流模式。率模式和税模式下的决策和其绩效评价是政策规制策略设计的基础。导入更加贴近现实世界的情景模拟,将生产领域成本、消费领域成本和循环处置环节成本作为系统决策的成本结构,将回收系统的效率进行差异化设置;在个体模式和集体模式下,研究率模式和税模式的决策、绩效以及模式评估问题。研究结果显示:个体模式下,税模式优于率模式,但参与人之间形不成统一偏好;集体模式下,率模式和税模式的优劣依赖于不同的成本结构环境,成本组合是驱动模式优劣的关键因素,动态环境成本决定了回收率。揭示出成本结构与率模式、税模式优劣评价之间的映射关系。Abstract:Extended producer responsibility holds producers responsible for collecting,recycling and reusing. The rate mode operated by the manufacturer and the tax mode operated by the government are the prevailing forms of realizing extended producer responsibility. Comparing two different modes,the regulator determines the optimal policy on the basis of decision-making and performances. Considering the realistic background,we divide environmental costs into landfill costs and disposal costs,and incorporate different efficiency of the recovery system. In a complex-cost environment,we examine the decision-making,performances,and evaluate two different modes-the rate mode and the tax mode. The results are somewhat different from the previous conclusions:under the decentralized decision making,the tax mode is better than the rate mode,but the participants cannot reach the same preferences; under the centralized decision making,it is hard to judge which mode is better because they depend on different environmental costs and production costs. Thus,cost combination is the key factor to determine which mode is better and the dynamic environmental costs decide the take-back rate.
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Key words:
- extended producer responsibility/
- rate mode/
- tax mode/
- cost-driven/
- performance
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