Keywords:
• environmental regulation/
• environmental protection tax/
• numerical simulation

Abstract:Under the background of the new environmental protection tax system,this paper combines environmental protection tax with other government environmental regulation actions,studies the strategic interaction between local government and sewage enterprises by using evolutionary game theory,and incorporates public reporting into the government revenue function. Based on the net income between different strategies of local governments and sewage enterprises,twelve evolutionary paths are obtained. On this basis,the process of enterprise emission reduction innovation is divided into development,growth and maturity stages for numerical simulation. The results show that the impact of the intensity of government regulation on enterprise emission reduction depends on the net income of the latter,and the former mainly depends on the level of regulatory costs; too low environmental tax rate at the early stage of enterprise emission reduction development will not lead to technological innovation; enterprises in the growth stage of emission reduction will make emission reduction innovation decisions. The policy depends on the government's strategy,while the emission reduction enterprises in the mature stage will take the initiative to innovate in emission reduction technology. Therefore,on the premise of the concurrence of various regulatory tools,the government should set environmental protection tax rates according to the different development cycles of enterprises,supplemented by certain tax relief and subsidies,in order to reduce the cost of pollution control and promote the evolution of emission reduction technology innovation in the production process.